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Although the debilitating consequences of peer pressure are well-documented and carry a
strong intuition when applied to investment in education, it is not evident how such pressures
might arise or be sustained in any sort of rational choice setting. This paper develops a
multiperiod model of endogenous peer pressure and education in an eﬀort to illuminate
these issues. The model involves an individual whose productive ability (type) is private
information. The key idea is that individuals face a tension between signaling their type to
the outside labour market and signaling their type to a peer group: signals that induce high
wages can be signals that induce peer rejection. The main results are that there exist no
equilibria in which all types of individual adopt distinct educational investment levels; that,
when individuals are not too patient, all equilibria satisfying a standard re￿nement involve
a binary partition of the type space in which all types accepted by the group pool on a
common low education and all types rejected by the group separate at distinctly higher levels
of education with correspondingly higher wages; and that when individuals are very patient,
there is an increase in the variation of education levels within the group and an increase
in the variance of types deemed acceptable by the group. Thus, the more those involved
discount the future, the more acute peer pressure becomes and the more homogenous groups
become.￿At the social level, peer groups discourage their members from putting forth
t h et i m ea n de ﬀort required to do well in school and from adopting the attitudes
and standard practices that enhance academic success. ... Peer group pressures
against academic striving take many forms, including ... exclusion from peer
activities or ostracism, ... . Individuals ￿resist￿ striving to do well academically
partly out of fear of peer responses and partly to avoid aﬀective dissonance￿
(Fordham and Ogbu, 1986:183).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The concept of peer pressure means many things in many contexts. It has, for example,
positive associations for encouraging voluntary contributions to collective action (e.g. Jones,
1984; Hollander, 1990; Kandel and Lazear, 1992), and it can be a source of concern, promot-
ing conformism on prima facie unproductive and debilitating behaviour (e.g. Fordham and
Ogbu, 1986; Ogbu 1991; Suskind, 1998; Akerlof and Kranton, 1999). This paper focuses on
the more negative aspects of peer pressure with respect to education.
A robust empirical regularity is that many minority groups do systematically worse in the
educational system, and are thereby systematically disadvantaged on the labour market, than
do other such groups or the majority group. Among explanations for this ￿nding, particularly
in regard to the relative educational performance of African Americans, is that most clearly
articulated by Ogbu: ￿Because of the ambivalence, aﬀective dissonance, and social pressures,
many black students who are academically able do not put forth the necessary eﬀort and
perserverance in their schoolwork and, consequently, do poorly in school￿ (Fordham and
Ogbu, 1986:177). And, as suggested by the quotation beginning this paper, an important (if
not the only) means through which such behaviour is induced in otherwise able students is
1peer pressure; the need or desire to be accepted by one￿s peers leads individuals to behave
in ways they would otherwise avoid. Similar arguments motivate recent work by Akerlof
(1997) and Akerlof and Kranton (1999) on the economic implications of social conformism
and cultural ￿identity￿. Inter alia, these authors survey a litany of works, both academic
and autobiographical, testifying to the tension many individuals of a minority culture feel
between doing what is expected to remain accepted by their peers or social group (be it
predicated on race, ethnicity or gender), and doing what is expected to succeed in a world
dominated by those in the majority culture.
Although the debilitating consequences of peer pressure are well-documented and carry a
strong intuition when applied to investment in education, it is not evident how such pressures
might arise or be sustained in any sort of rational choice setting. For instance, if an individual
demonstrates somehow that he or she is not ￿the right sort￿ of person for the group, why
would group members engage in costly eﬀorts to keep them in line? And if such persons
are evidently not of the same sort as those in the group, what is it that leads them to
succumb to peer pressure encouraging prima facie suboptimal actions? Similarly, even with
answers to such questions, it remains unclear what the observable economic implications of
peer pressure might be in particular contexts. In what follows, I explore these issues in the
context of a stylized formal model of educational choice.
There are large literatures concerning group in￿uences on individual decision-making in
sociology and social psychology, yet eﬀorts to develop more formal models addressing how
such in￿uences aﬀect economic decisions in general, let alone with regard to education and
investment in human capital, are relatively new. And within the formal literature, most
of the work is devoted to understanding the economic implications of (more or less) given
social norms. Akerlof (1976, 1980) are early examples on how given norms of conformity
and fairness in￿uence labour market behaviour and collective action. Recent contributions
2beyond those cited earlier include Bernheim (1994), who provides an elegant signaling model
in which both conformism and ￿deviant￿ behaviours arise endogenously in equilibrium; Lind-
beck and Weibull (1999) look at a political economy model of redistributive taxation and
labour supply in which the tax-rate and the intensity to which ￿living oﬀ one￿s work￿ is a
signi￿cant social norm are endogenous; Cole et al (1992) and contributions to a special is-
sue of the Journal of Public Economics (1998) devoted to norms and status explore various
models of social interaction and economic behaviour.1 While much of this literature bears in
some way on the issue here, none of it directly considers the role of peer pressure on human
capital formation.2
The model involves an individual whose productive ability (type) is private information.
The central underlying idea is that individuals face a tension between signaling their type
to the outside labour market and signaling their type to a peer group: signals that induce
high wages can be signals that induce peer rejection. It is important to emphasize at the
outset that, in the model, ￿r m sa r ea s s u m e dt oh a v en oi n t e r e s ti na n ye m p l o y e e ￿ sg r o u p
membership, and groups are assumed not to have any basic preference over whether a po-
tential member is employed or wealthy. Consequently, there is no intrinsic con￿ict built into
the model between individuals being highly educated and employed, and being members
of a group. At the same time, other things equal, all types strictly prefer to be accepted
rather than rejected by their peer group; the group, however, is concerned only to accept
those individuals who will be reliable group members in that they can be depended upon
to support the group in diﬃcult times. Examples of this sort of reliability are not hard to
￿nd; they range from gang members who can be trusted not to betray other members when
1There is also a rapidly growing formal literature exploring the evolution of norms and conventions that
is tangential to the focus of this paper; see, for instance, Kandori (1992).
2A partial exception to this assertion is Akerlof and Kranton (1999), who use the peer pressure and
education case to motivate one of their models.
3subjected to police investigation, to residents of a community who can be relied upon to
m a k et h et i m ea n de ﬀort to help their neighbours when the latter are in need. An important
characteristic of these and many other examples, one that in large part de￿nes what it is
to be a member of social group rather than a strictly economic market, is that the costs of
membership are in terms of personal time and eﬀort, not money per se.3
Although the assumption that all individuals prefer to be accepted by their peers is
taken as primitive (and predicated on the sociological and psychological evidence that such
preferences exist and are widespread), the operationalization of which types constitute re-
liable group members is endogenous to the model, turns out to be far from a single type,
and gives rise naturally to a notion of peer pressure. The principal result is an existence
and characterization of a speci￿c class of equilibria, central to the canonic job signaling lit-
erature initiated by Spence (1974). Unlike in the canonic model where this class consists
exclusively of equilibria in which all types invest in distinct levels of education (i.e. sepa-
rate) and so attract distinct wages, in the present model there exist no separating equilibria.
Instead, equilibria in the class comprise a set of types all of whom choose the same, low,
education level (i.e. pool) while the remaining types separate, with the lowest separating
type making a signi￿cantly higher investment in education and earning a correspondingly
higher wage than those adopting the pooling investment. The resulting binary partition of
types corresponds to those accepted by their peers (the pooling types) and those rejected
(the separating types). And it is worth emphasizing that nothing is built into the model
that requires accepted types to adopt a common educational investment, it is an equilib-
rium outcome. On the other hand, the speci￿c class of equilibria is empty when individuals
value the future suﬃciently highly. In this case, a natural extension of the original class of
equilibria leads to some variation in the education investment choices among those accepted
3Less prosaically: ￿money can￿t buy you love￿.
4by the peer group and a simultaneous increase in the variance of types deemed acceptable.
Inter alia, therefore, the model supports some comparative statics on group composition and
intra-group behaviour as functions of individuals￿ discount factors.
2M o d e l
There are an in￿nite number of discrete time periods, indexed t =0 ,1,2,.... The initial
period, t =0 , is distinguished as the ￿school years￿; periods t>0 are collectively referred
to as the ￿post-school years￿. In principle, three sorts of agent interact in each period:
individuals, ￿rms and a (suitably anthropomorphized) peer group.
2.1 Individuals
An individual￿s abilities (types) are private information to the individual and chosen by
Nature at the start of the school years according to a smooth common knowledge c.d.f. F
with density having support [0,θ), θ ￿nite. Types, once chosen, are ￿xed over time. With
some abuse of terminology, where there is no ambiguity I shall refer to an individual of
type θ simply as ￿individual θ￿. In addition to a type, an individual is endowed with one
unit of eﬀort in each period. In each period t, the individual chooses how to allocate his or
her endowment of eﬀort; any eﬀort level expended on any activity in a period is commonly
observable and eﬀort is nonstorable.4
In the initial period t =0 , the ￿school years￿, individual θ allocates eﬀort between
leisure and a once-and-for-all investment in education. Since education and eﬀort expended
4It is perhaps more natural to think of an individual allocating time, rather than observable eﬀort. The
use of the eﬀort terminology, however, is to avoid the possibility of any notational confusion between time
periods and an individual￿s allocation of time within any period.
5on acquiring education are identi￿ed without loss of generality here, let s ∈ [0,1] denote
the level of education acquired, or input of individual eﬀort to education expended, in the
school years. Although the output of education for any level of eﬀort is independent of an
individual￿s type, the cost of eﬀort so expended is not. In addition to the direct opportunity
cost of eﬀort used for education in the school years, assume there is a further cost of any
educational investment to individual θ, c(s,θ) ≥ 0. As in the canonical signaling literature,
the cost function c is assumed to satisfy
cs > 0,c θ < 0;css > 0,c sθ < 0 ∀s>0;lim
s→0cs(s,•)=0and lim
s→1cs(s,•)=∞, (1)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives in the usual way. Thus eﬀort is costly for all types
but higher types ￿nd it less costly to acquire any given level of education. At the end of the
school years, an individual￿s education level is ￿xed and competitive bidding between ￿rms
leads to post-school employment at an endogenously determined per period wage, w ≥ 0.
At the start of any period t ≥ 1, individual θ may or may not be an accepted member of
her peer group. If θ is not such an accepted member then she consumes one unit of leisure
and her given wage; on the other hand, if is θ an accepted member of the group then θ may
face a period t eﬀort allocation problem.5
Let individual θ be an accepted member of the peer group for period t ≥ 1.M e m b e r s h i p
is valued because, other things equal, leisure time spent in the group is valued more highly
than leisure time spent outside the group. Group membership, however, involves some costs
on occasion. Speci￿cally, while no direct contribution is required of any individual accepted
by the group in the school years, at the start of each subsequent period t =1 ,2,..., θ may
or may not be required to make a contribution to the group￿s well-being. I assume that such
5Adding a discrete eﬀort cost for showing up to work in any period and assuming ￿rms ￿re an employee
who ever fails to show up, leaves the following analysis unaﬀected. However, it turns out that in equilibrium
no individual earning a strictly positive wage ever fails to show up for work.
6contributions are observable and that their costs to an individual are measured in terms of
eﬀort. Suppose that in any period t>0, Nature chooses a required contribution κt ∈ {0,k}
from the individual to the group, 0 <k<1; for future reference, let π ∈ (0,1) be the (date
invariant) probability that κt =0 .6 The cost to an individual θ of making a contribution
k is assumed to depend on the individual￿s type. The cost to θ of making a contribution
k,m e a s u r e di nt e r m so fe ﬀort, is θk,s oh i g h e rt y p e s￿nd it more onerous to comply than
lower types and any type θ > 1/k is unable to ful￿l lad e m a n dt oc o n t r i b u t ek (throughout,
assume θ > 1/k). The eﬀort allocation problem in period t for an individual member of the
peer group, therefore, is on whether or not to contribute to the group if called upon do so
in that period.
For any t ≥ 0,l e tat ∈ {0,1} denote whether the individual is rejected (at =0 )o r
accepted (at =1 ) by his or her peer group in t,a n dl e tv(lt|at) be the individual￿s period t
payoﬀ from leisure lt ∈ [0,1]. Then given the individual￿s type θ and school year education
decision, s ∈ [0,1], θ￿s period t =0payoﬀ is,
v(1 − s|a0) − c(s,θ). (2)
Assume v(l|•) twice diﬀerentiable concave increasing in l on (0,1). Further assume that
having no leisure at all is worthless irrespective of group acceptance, and that both total
and marginal values from consuming any strictly positive amount leisure are greater as an
accepted group member than otherwise: formally, v(0|1) = v(0|0) = 0 and, for all l>0,
v(l|1) >v (l|0) and v
0(l|1) >v
0(l|0). (3)
6As suggested in the Introduction, an interpretation of such contributions here is in terms of helping
out in diﬃcult times, where these fall upon the group or the average group member with frequency 1 − π.
And while costs might then be more naturally modeled as continuous variables, doing so adds little further
insight.
7I nt h ec a s et h a tθ is an accepted group member in some t>0 and is asked to make a
contribution κt,l e tdt ∈ {0,1} denote θ￿s decision on whether or not to comply (respectively,
dt =1or =0 ). Then in any post-school year period, θ￿s period t>0 payoﬀ from choosing
dt is,
w + v(1 − atdtθκt|at). (4)
2.2 Firms
Assume there are at least two identical and noncollusive ￿rms which, at the end of the
initial period t =0 , engage in Bertrand bidding for employees to produce a homogenous and
nonstorable product in each period t =1 ,2,.... The salient features of an employee for a
￿rm are education and type. So an employee is characterized by a pair (s,θ) and the net
value to a ￿rm hiring employee (s,θ) at a wage-rate w ≥ 0 in any period t>0 is
Yt(w,s,θ)=[ y(s,θ) − w]. (5)
Assume (for convenience) that ￿rms do not discount the future and that
ys > 0,y θ > 0;yss ≤ 0,y sθ > 0 and y(0,•) ≡ 0. (6)
Firms have no interest in any individual save in his or her capacity as an employee,
de￿ned by a pair (s,θ). In particular, the ￿rm neither observes nor cares about what any
individual does while away from work. Nevertheless, it is evidently possible to imagine a
variety of employment contracts in this setting. Among other things, under the assumption
that per period output is observable, the ￿rm learns any employee￿s type for sure by the end
of the ￿rst employment period. So in general we might expect to observe wage contracts
depending in part on future realized output. But dealing explicitly with such complications
8here distracts greatly from the focus of the paper.7 Consequently I shall assume them away
by presuming ￿rms suﬃciently large, ￿rst, that average realized output from individuals with
a given education level accurately re￿ects the ￿rms￿ expectations at the time of recruitment
and, second, to render individual contract renegotiation unpro￿tably expensive. So feasible
employment contracts are taken to specify a constant wage-rate over time.
2.3 Peer group
To avoid trivialities, assume throughout that the peer group is nonempty. Although, other
things equal, individuals prefer inclusion in the peer group they may not in fact be accepted
by the (suitably anthropomorphized) group. Just as group acceptance is important to indi-
viduals, individuals yield value to the group as a whole through consumption externalities,
contributions, collegiality and so forth.
Assume that if an individual is rejected by the group during that individual￿s school
years, t =0 , then the individual cannot be accepted in any period t thereafter (it turns
out that this is without any loss of generality in the current model); however, an individual
accepted by the group at t =0may be rejected in any subsequent period. Normalize group
payoﬀsi na n yp e r i o dt =1 ,2,... to be zero in the case that a given individual is rejected
at t =0 . Suppose the individual is accepted at t =0and remains accepted at the end of
period t − 1 > 0. At the beginning of the period t, the group decides whether to accept
(at =1 ) or reject (at =0 ) θ for that period, following which Nature randomly chooses the
group contribution κt ∈ {0,k} required of θ and the individual either does (dt =1 )o rd o e s
not (dt =0 ) make the contribution; both the realization κt and the individual￿s decision are
observed by the group.
7If individuals￿ types are fully revealed during the school years, then there is clearly no room for subsequent
contract renegotiation. But this is not true when equilibrium involves any pooling.
9Let g(at,d t,κt) be the period t>0 payoﬀ to the group from action at, given the indi-
vidual makes decision dt when the required contribution is κt. Then, for all realizations κt,
g(0,d t,κt)=0for all dt and
g(1,1,κt)=b>0 ≥ g(1,0,κt)=−Bκt.
The bene￿ts B, b are (for simplicity) taken to be independent of t and κt.
Thus, irrespective of whether the individual chooses to contribute, the group receives
az e r op a y o ﬀ when it rejects the individual, but the group￿s payoﬀ when it accepts the
individual is contingent on the individual￿s behaviour. The key feature of the group￿s payoﬀs
for what follows is that the group is strictly worse oﬀ having accepted an individual who
chooses not to make her required contribution than it would be were such an individual
rejected; i.e. −Bk < 0.W h e n κt =0 , the group strictly prefers to have accepted the
individual for period t.
The group￿s payoﬀs above are conditional on t>0. The group￿s initial decision on
whether to accept an individual, however, is taken during the school years t =0 .A s s u m e
that the net period t =0bene￿ts to the group of accepting an individual are normalized
to zero (for example, there might be some cost to the group for initiating a new member,
oﬀsetting any t =0expected bene￿t of adding the individual).
Recall that 1 − π is the probability that the individual is required to contribute k>0











Assuming π is strictly smaller than Bk/[Bk+b] is a non-triviality condition; as will become
clear shortly, without the assumption all individuals are always accepted into the group.
Substantively, assuming π is smaller than v(1|0)/v(1|1) is equivalent to assuming that in-
dividuals prefer surely consuming their leisure time on their own, to the expected value of
10being an accepted group member when there is a chance that remaining in the group requires
having no leisure at all to consume; that is πv(1|1) + (1 − π)v(0|1) <v (1|0). Technically,
the assumption precludes having to deal explicitly with some boundary cases in the later
analysis.
Finally, just as ￿rms are presumed to observe only aggregate output from those of a given
education level, assume that if a group member is an employee in some ￿rm (i.e. w>0),
then the group cannot identify the speci￿c output of the ￿rm attributable to that member.
This seems quite innocuous.
2.4 Strategies and payoﬀs
The basic solution concept used here is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
At t =0 , the school years, an individual learns his or her type θ ∈ [0,θ) and chooses an
observable eﬀort level s ∈ [0,1] according to an education investment strategy,
σ :[ 0 ,θ) → [0,1].
Having observed the individual￿s choice of eﬀort σ(θ) ∈ [0,1], the peer group chooses
whether or not to accept the individual into the group. The group￿s initial acceptance
strategy is a choice,
α0 :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
where, for any s ∈ [0,1], α0(s) is the probability the group accepts the individual in the
school years. While rejection in the school years involves rejection for all subsequent periods
(which turns out to be consistent with equilibrium behaviour), acceptance is contingent on
future decisions.
Firms observe an individual￿s eﬀort (equivalently, educational achievement), σ(θ) ∈ [0,1],
at the end of the period and engage in Bertrand wage bidding for his or her labour. Given
11that wages cannot be renegotiated in subsequent periods, a wage strategy is a map,
w :[ 0 ,1] → [0,∞).






where F|s ≡ F(θ|s) describes the ￿rm￿s (and group￿s) conditional beliefs regarding the
individual￿s type, and the ￿rm makes zero expected pro￿ts at the time of recruitment. Once
the wage is set, the ￿rm has no further decision to make. Hereafter, therefore, I take (8) as
given.
As will become clear later, there is no loss in generality by restricting attention to pure
strategies only during the post-school years. For t ≥ 1,agroup history ht is a description
of all the actions taken in periods t0 =0 ,1,2,...,tby Nature (κt ∈ {0,k}), the individual
(σ(θ), dt ∈ {0,1}), and the group (at ∈ {0,1}). For t =0and realization a0 of the strategy
α0(σ(θ)),s e th0 =( σ(θ),w(σ(θ),F|σ(θ)),a 0) and, for all t ≥ 1,s e t
ht =( ht−1,(κt;dt;at)).
Let Ht = {ht} denote the set of all possible group histories for t ≥ 0.T h e nw ec a nd e ￿ne
the peer group￿s period t ≥ 1 (pure) strategy as a function,
αt : Ht−1 → {0,1}
where αt(κt,h t−1) is the probability the group accepts the individual in period t.
Given individuals￿ preferences are separable in wages, period t ≥ 1 (pure) strategy for
the individual is a function,
ψt : {0,k}￿[0,θ) ￿ Ht−1 → {0,1}.
12Putting the pieces together, a strategy for an individual is a list, (σ,{ψt}∞
t=1);as t r a t e g y
for the group is a list, (α0,{αt}∞
t=1); and, under the assumptions on contracts, the (symmetric)
wage strategy for any ￿rm is ￿xed to be the function w de￿ned by (8).
Once an individual￿s wage rate is determined at the end of the school years, it is ￿xed















where δ ∈ (0,1) is the individual￿s discount factor, E is the expectations operator over Na-
ture￿s choice of contribution κt and, by an abuse of notation, v(•|α0(σ(θ))) = α0(σ(θ))v(•|1)+
[1 − α0(σ(θ))]v(•|0).
To de￿ne payoﬀsf o rt h eg r o u p ,￿rst suppose the group accepts the individual in the
school years, a0 =1 , and, for any t ≥ 1, recall g(at,d t,κt) ∈ {b,−Bκt,0} is the stage-game





   
   
0 if a0 =0
Pt=∞
t=1 γt R θ
0 [Eg(αt(ht−1),ψt(κt,θ,h t−1),κt)]dF(θ|ht−1) else
. (10)
3 Equilibrium




an individual and a strategy (α∗
0,{α∗
t}∞
t=1) for the group, constituting sequentially rational
13mutual best responses at every subgame and supported by beliefs over an individual￿s type,
F(θ|•), derived from Bayes rule wherever possible. To ￿nd equilibria to the game, I begin
with behaviour in periods following the school years.
3.1 The post-school years
There are many equilibria to the model described above, but in what follows I focus only
on those in which the group adopts a simple, familiar and intuitive strategy in the subgame
beginning t =1 , viz. conditional on accepting an individual in the school years (t =0 ),
the group continues to accept that individual so long as he or she has made the required
contribution to group maintenance in every preceeding period; should the individual ever
elect not to contribute as required in some period t ≥ 1, the group rejects the individual in
every period thereafter. Formally, the group￿s strategy contingent on accepting an individual
during the school years, α0(σ(θ)) = 1,i st a k e nt ob e :
[P1] : ∀t ≥ 1, α
∗
t(ht−1)=1⇔ [ht−1 : dt−1 =1 ] .
Call the group strategy [P1] the peer pressure strategy.
Contingent on being accepted by the group in the school years, an individual￿s best
response to the peer pressure strategy depends on his or her type. Formally, for any ￿xed







∀θ ≤ b θ, ψ
∗
t[b θ](κt,θ,h t−1)=1for all κt
∀θ > b θ, [ψ
∗
t[b θ](0,θ,h t−1)=1 ,ψ
∗





Under the strategy ψ
∗
t[b θ],a n yt y p el o w e rt h a nb θ always contributes and any type greater
than b θ only contributes when the required cost is low.
We are now in a position to describe the post-school year behaviour of interest. The
proof of Proposition 1, as with all subsequent formal results, is con￿ned to an Appendix.
14Proposition 1 Let σ(θ) be individual θ￿s school year educational investment and suppose,
conditional on being accepted by the group in the school years, the individual￿s post-school
year behaviour is described by [P2].T h e n α0(σ(θ)) = 1 and [P1] jointly constitute a best
response to σ(θ) and [P2] if and only if
F(￿ θ|σ(θ)) ≥
[(1 − π)Bk− πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
.
Furthermore, there exists a unique type b θ(δ) < 1/k such that, conditional on being accepted
by the group in the school years, the strategy ψ
∗
t[b θ(δ)] de￿ned by [P2] is a best response to
[P1]. Moreover, b θ(δ) is strictly increasing in δ on [0,1);a n dlimδ↓0b θ(δ)=0 .
Assume hereon that the post-school years￿ behaviour is as described by Proposition 1 and call
any equilibrium to the full game in which Proposition 1 describes post-school year behaviour,
a peer pressure equilibrium.
Proposition 1 says that the peer pressure strategy induces a unique threshold strategy
ψ
∗
t[b θ(δ)] as a best response by individuals belonging to the group. The critical type b θ(δ) is
de￿ned by precisely that type who, conditional on being accepted during the school years, is
indiﬀerent between contributing and not contributing the high cost when so required (where,
given the group uses the peer pressure strategy, not contributing the high cost results in being
rejected). As usual, the more individuals￿ care about the future, the less they have to gain
from any short run free-riding and so this critical type increases in the discount factor.
It follows that, to accept an individual in the school years and support the peer pressure
strategy, the belief the group must hold regarding the individual￿s type, F(￿ θ|σ(θ)),m u s tb e
no smaller than the quantity
F0 ≡
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
. (11)
Assumption (7) insures the critical value F0 is strictly positive and it is easy to check that
F0 is decreasing in π, the group￿s discount factor γ and the bene￿t b, but increasing in Bk.
15Consequently, the critical type b θ(δ) (at least in part) vindicates the group never taking back
a member who is rejected because of failing to contribute as required: in equilibrium, the
types rejected for not contributing are precisely those types who would never contribute a
high cost and who are thus unacceptable to the group.
Hereafter, to save notation I leave the dependency of the individual￿s peer pressure equi-





3.2 The school years
Given any educational eﬀort σ(θ) during the school years, t =0 , ￿rms￿ best response decisions
are given by (8) with s = σ(θ). And as remarked earlier, ceteris paribus all individuals strictly
prefer to be accepted rather than rejected by the group during the school years. However,
Proposition 1 shows that the group is not happy to accept all types as members: the group
strictly prefers to accept θ if and only if F(￿ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) >F 0 and is indiﬀerent over accepting
and rejecting whenever F(￿ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) = F0.
Given Proposition 1, the ￿rms￿ wage schedules (8) and the group￿s school year decision
criterion (11) depend essentially on the individual educational investment strategy, σ.A s
in most signaling games, there are multiple equilibria possible, even within the class of peer
pressure equilibria. One sort of equilibrium, however, surely does not exist here and that is
any fully separating equilibria in which, for all types θ,θ
0, θ 6= θ
0 implies σ(θ) 6= σ(θ
0).8
8Strictly speaking, the notion of a separating strategy here should be con￿ned to the set of types for
which the utility-maximizing education under complete information is strictly positive. Nothing in the
analysis hinges on this and so, to avoid repeatedly having to make the appropriate quali￿cations, assume
θ > 0 implies θ￿s complete information maximizing choice of eﬀort is not zero (whether or not θ is accepted
by the group). Given (1), this is assured if
lim
s→0
[ys(s,0) − v0(1 − s|•)] > 0.
16Say that a peer pressure equilibrium is separating if the equilibrium educational invest-
ment strategy is separating over all types θ > 0.
Proposition 2 There exist no separating peer pressure equilibria.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind Proposition 2. The ￿gure describes the net
(peer pressure equilibrium) utility accruing to individual ￿ θ(δ) a saf u n c t i o no ft h ec h o s e n
educational level under complete information, u∗(s,a0,w(s);￿ θ): at any given educational
investment level s, the individual￿s net payoﬀ is strictly greater being accepted than be-
ing rejected by the group and, further, in each case the net payoﬀ is strictly concave in
educational eﬀort with an interior maximum.
Figure 1 here
If there were a (fully) separating equilibrium, then there is no residual incomplete information
and only those types θ ≤ ￿ θ(δ) would be accepted by the group. This implies that the
boundary type ￿ θ(δ) has to be indiﬀerent in equilibrium between being accepted with a wage
w and being rejected at a wage w0 >w , where the inequality follows from the marginal value
of leisure being lower for rejected than for accepted individuals at any positive educational
investment level. Therefore, as is clear from Figure 1, to support the equilibrium, the
educational level inducing the wage w must be strictly less than ￿ θ(δ)￿s most preferred level of
education conditional on group acceptance, s∗
1. But this is inconsistent with separation under
which higher types must invest strictly more than they would under complete information
so as to deter lower types from mimicking them (Appendix, Lemma 4).
Proposition 2 asserts that whenever there is peer pressure of the sort de￿ned here, then
necessarily the equilibrium involves some pooling of types. This still leaves a very large
17number of possibilities for equilibria, depending in part on the parameters in eﬀect. Before
considering any re￿nements, it is useful to establish some further general properties of any
peer pressure equilibrium. For any pair of strategies (σ,α0), denote the sets of types accepted
and rejected by the group as, respectively, A(σ,α0)={θ : α0(σ(θ)) = 1} and R(σ,α0)=
{θ : α0(σ(θ)) = 0}.
Proposition 3 Let (σ∗,α∗
0) be components of some peer pressure equilibrium. Then,
(1) A(σ∗,α∗
0) and R(σ∗,α∗




0) 6=[ 0 ,θ) implies there exists †>0 such that σ∗(θ) is constant on at least
one of the intervals (inf R(σ∗,α∗
0)−†,inf R(σ∗,α∗
0)) or (inf R(σ∗,α∗
0),inf R(σ∗,α∗
0)+†);a n d
(3) if σ∗ is separating on (inf R(σ∗,α∗
0),inf R(σ∗,α∗
0)+†), inf R(σ∗,α∗
0) ≥ ￿ θ(δ).
The ￿rst claim of Proposition 3 is intuitive and follows easily from the monotonicity
of any equilibrium educational strategy in type (Appendix, Lemma 3); and the intuition
for the second claim is essentially identical to that supporting Proposition 2. The ￿nal
claim of the result is suggestive: if types rejected by the group adopt a separating strategy,
then necessarily the group accepts some types in equilibrium which they would reject under
complete information. The implications of this for observed behaviour in the longer run are
discussed below.
Although the previous two results tell us a good deal about equilibria to the game, they
do not, as already remarked, pin down exactly what can occur. Consequently, I consider
further belief-based equilibrium re￿nements. As Banks (1990, p.16) observes, most of the
usual re￿nements used for costly signaling games support identical equilibria when payoﬀs
exhibit an appropriate monotonicity property, a property satis￿ed here where, other things
being equal, higher wages are preferred to lower wages by all types (see also Cho and Sobel
1990). One such re￿nement much used in the literature is that of D1 equilibria (Banks and
Sobel,1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel 1990).
18Loosely speaking, the D1 re￿nement requires out-of-equilibrium actions to be interpreted
as being taken by those types having most to gain from the deviation relative to their pay-
oﬀs from the candidate equilibrium, conditional on the uninformed agents best-responding
to these beliefs. Equilibria supported by such out-of-equilibrium beliefs are called D1 equi-
libria, and the only D1 equilibrium to the canonic Spence job signaling model is the Riley
(separating) equilibrium. The Riley equilibrium is the unique eﬃcient separating equilib-
rium de￿ned by the initial condition whereby the lowest separating type adopts its complete
information best educational investment level; all higher types choose the lowest educational
levels consistent with separation and these strictly exceed their respective complete infor-
mation decisions (Appendix, Lemma 4). Although it is not clearcut that the separating
equilibria to the Spence model constitute the ￿correct￿ predictions, they are certainly focal
from an analytical perspective and have considerable substantive intuition; insofar as high
type individuals can bene￿t from distinguishing themselves and are capable of so doing,
then we might expect any equilibrium behaviour to re￿ect this. Consequently, I look for
separation in equilibrium educational investment strategies in the current model; in particu-
lar, the intuition for why we might expect separation in the Spence model applies a fortiori
when considering the educational eﬀort decisions of those rejected by the group during the
school years. Thus, for both this reason and to facilitate comparisons across models, it seems
reasonable to apply the D1 re￿nement to the current model.
Unfortunately, unlike for the Spence model, existence of D1 equilibria is not assured for
all admissible parameterizations. Before stating the existence result, it is useful to identify
some key properties of D1 equilibria conditional on their existence. For any type θ,l e tσc
0(θ)
denote the individual￿s utility maximizing choice of education assuming that θ is common
knowledge and that the group rejects θ in the school years, a0 =0 .
Proposition 4 Let (σ∗,α∗
0) be components of a D1 peer pressure equilibrium. Then
19(1) σ∗(θ)=σ∗(θ




∗ ≥ ￿ θ(δ);a n d
(2) the restriction of σ∗ to the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α∗
0)=( θ
∗,ﬂ θ), is the unique
eﬃcient separating equilibrium strategy on R(σ∗,α∗





In words, in any D1 peer pressure equilibrium the type-space can be partitioned into two
intervals, [0,θ
∗] and (θ
∗,∞),s u c ht h a ta l lt y p e si n[0,θ
∗] pool on a common educational
investment level and are accepted by the group, and all types greater than θ
∗ separate and
are rejected by the group. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 4.
Figure 2 here
There is no guarantee that D1 peer pressure equilibria, when they exist, are unique.
However, from the proposition and the monotonicity of payoﬀsi nt y p ea ta n yg i v e ne d u -
cation, wage and group decision, a strictly positive educational investment by individuals
accepted by the group, say s1 > 0, can be supported in a D1 equilibrium only if the lowest
accepted type is willing to choose s1 rather than invest in education at some s<s 1. Such a
condition is necessary because, under D1, any out-of-equilibrium downward deviation from
s1 is interpreted by the ￿r m sa sc o m i n gs u r e l yf r o mt h el o w e s tt y p e ,θ =0 .T h e l o w e r i s
the discount factor, therefore, the more likely it is that peer pressure leads to pooling in the
group on minimal educational achievement.
Proposition 4 says that if a D1 equilibrium exists, the educational investment strategy σ∗
must be separating over the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α∗
0). By Proposition 3, therefore, we
must have the highest types accepted by the group using a pooling educational investment
strategy in equilibrium and the highest accepted type can be no lower than ￿ θ(δ).B u t
since D1 also rules out any discontinuities in the educational strategy σ∗ on A(σ∗,α∗
0),i ti s
possible for there not to exist an educational level s1 and an associated equilibrium wage
20w(s1) consistent both with ￿ θ(δ) and the lowest accepted type θ =0choosing s1 at w.T h u s
there is no guarantee that D1 equilibria generally exist in the model. It turns out, however,
that so long as individuals are suﬃciently impatient, there is no problem.
Proposition 5 There are discount factors δ1,δ2 with 0 < δ1 ≤ δ2 < 1, such that D1 peer
pressure equilibria exist if δ ≤ δ1 and only if δ ≤ δ2.
Proposition 5 says that D1 peer pressure equilibria surely exist for low discount factors
(δ ≤ δ1), might exist for some factors slightly higher (δ ∈ (δ1,δ2]), but surely do not exist for
suﬃciently high values of δ (δ > δ2). To get some intuition for the result, consider Figure 3.
Figure 3 here
The downward sloping curves labeled θ
∗(δ;s) describe, as a function of δ, the type indiﬀerent
between pooling on s ≥ 0 and being accepted by the group, and separating at his or her
complete information best educational choice, say s(θ
∗), and being rejected. Individual
θ
∗(δ;s), therefore, is the marginal equilibrium member of the group in an equilibrium in
which all individuals accepted by the group choose education level s.
Suppose ￿rst that the discount factor is some δ
0 < δ1 and assume that accepted types in an
equilibrium at δ
0 pool on zero education; in this case, ￿ θ(δ
0) < θ
∗(δ
0;0). Under the assumptions
on beliefs de￿ning D1, any deviation to a strictly positive out-of-equilibrium education level
s ∈ (0,s(θ
∗)) induces both ￿rms and the group to infer the deviant￿s type as θ
∗(δ
0;0).I t
follows that by choosing to deviate to some education level †>0, the individual elicits an
appropriately higher wage (a bene￿t) but is rejected by the group (a cost); in equilibrium,
these responses deter θ
∗(δ
0;0)from such a deviation and the equilibrium satis￿es D1.
Now consider some discount factor δ
00 > δ2 and assume s00 > 0 is the highest educational
level that can be sustained in any equilibrium at δ
00 in which all types [0,θ
∗(δ
00;s00)] are
21willing to pool and be accepted by the group. Given s00 > 0 the common wage paid to
all accepted group members is strictly positive and so the indiﬀerent marginal type here,
θ
∗(δ;s00), is strictly greater than the type θ




Consequently, if this individual deviates to s00 + † and reveals her type, she earns a higher
wage as before but is no longer rejected by the group; ￿ θ(δ
00) > θ
∗(δ
00;s00) implies the individual
is a reliable group member so the group￿s best response conditional on learning her type is
to continue to accept her. Therefore, such a deviation makes θ
∗(δ
00;s00) strictly better oﬀ
implying the equilibrium at δ
00 cannot satisfy D1.
The argument for the proposition shows that discount rates such as δ
0 and δ
00 surely
exist. In fact, the proof for the existence of D1 equilibria at rates δ ≤ δ1 is constructive and
establishes a stronger result:
Proposition 6 There is a discount factor δ1 > 0 s u c ht h a taD 1p e e rp r e s s u r ee q u i l i b r i u m
exists in which all accepted types pool on zero educational investment if and only if δ ≤ δ1.
Moreover, at each δ ≤ δ1 there is a unique ￿zero education￿ D1 equilibrium.
Although the proposition involves no claim that the ￿zero education￿ D1 equilibrium is the
unique D1 equilibrium for δ ≤ δ1, the willingness of individuals to acquire any signi￿cant
education in the school years is much diminished when the future is heavily discounted.
That peer pressure incentives should drive equilibrium education to zero for group members
is therefore not implausible. And even if higher types would, absent peer pressure, select
signi￿cant education levels, the more costly it becomes for the lowest types to acquire ed-
ucation the more likely it becomes that the zero education D1 equilibrium is the only such
equilibrium.
When δ > δ2, insisting on the D1 re￿nement leads to equilibrium non-existence, as
discussed above, and may also do so for δ > δ1. However, there do exist many other (non-
D1) peer pressure equilibria for these discount rates. Since a particularly appealing property
22of D1 equilibria when they exist is (I believe) that they demand separation over the set of
types rejected by the peer group, I propose to look only at equilibria for high factors that
preserve this property. And, to preserve some sort of continuity in the equilibrium selection,
I also restrict attention to those separating segments de￿ned by the initial condition that
the least rejected type separates with its complete information best educational investment
level. In view of Proposition 3(3), this gives the following re￿ned set of equilibria.
Proposition 7 Suppose δ > δ1 and no D1 equilibrium exists. Assume (σ∗,α∗
0) are compo-
nents of a peer pressure equilibrium in which the restriction of σ∗ to the set of rejected types,
R(σ∗,α∗
0)=( θ
∗,ﬂ θ), is the unique eﬃcient separating equilibrium strategy on R(σ∗,α∗
0) with
initial condition, limη↓0 σ∗(θ
∗+η)=σc
0(θ
∗).T h e nθ
∗ ≥ ￿ θ(δ) and there exists a type θ1 < ￿ θ(δ)
such that:






(2) either the restriction of σ∗ to the interval [0,θ1) is separating, or there exists at least
one other pooling segment in this interval; in both cases limθ↑θ1 σ∗(θ) <s 1.
Proposition 7 leaves open a variety of possibilities for equilibrium education decisions for
the lowest segment of types, [0,θ1). There are two polar cases worth making explicit here:
in the ￿rst, all types θ ∈ [0,θ1) separate; and in the second, all types θ ∈ [0,θ1) pool on a
common educational investment. Figure 4 illustrates these alternatives.
Figure 4 here
The higher is the discount factor, the greater the long-run economic return to educational
investment in the school years. It seems intuitive that any negative impact of peer pressure on
individual eﬀort in the school years is increasingly attenuated as people value the future more
highly and the equilibrium predictions of the last three propositions re￿ect this intuition.
23When the discount factor is suﬃciently low, peer pressure is eﬀective and the desire to
signal that one is an appropriate type for the group induces considerable underinvestment
in education by many types, at least relative to the no-peer pressure separating equilibrium;
only the highest types break away. The consequence is that group members all share a
common minimal education level with the associated wage, while those rejected by the
group are discretely more educated and earn distinctly higher incomes. For higher discount
factors (δ > δ1), peer pressure is attenuated. At least for δ > δ2, there has to be variation
in the equilibrium distribution of educational eﬀorts and economic returns among accepted
group members. And since the critical type is increasing in the discount factor (Proposition
1), the group, other things being equal, accepts a broader set of types; thus we expect to
￿nd not only increasing variation in education and wage levels within the group as δ goes
up, but also an increase in the type variation of accepted group members. Nevertheless peer
pressure remains manifest in that the high types accepted by the group in the school years
necessarily adopt the same educational eﬀort strategy and continue to include types who will
almost surely renege on the group and be rejected at some post-school year date. Formally,
as illustrated in both Figures 2 and 4, Propositions 4 and 7 directly imply,
Corollary 1 Assume the restriction of the educational investment strategy in a peer pressure
equilibrium to the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α∗
0), is separating on that set. Then there
(almost always) exists a strictly positive measure of types who are accepted by the group in
the school years but who leave the group when ￿rst asked to contribute the high cost, k>0.
And since educational investment is sunk, these types see no change in their earned income.
Consequently, the model predicts that we should observe the (relatively) high types
leaving the group at some time, being rejected but continuing to work at their original,
low, wage. In other words, following the school years there are, eventually, three sorts of
24individual in equilibrium: those accepted by the group who remain loyal and earn little;
those originally accepted who eventually renege on the group and are rejected but continue
to earn the low wage common to group members; and those rejected by the group in the
school years who are signi￿cantly more educated and earn distinctly higher incomes than
the other two sorts.
4 A benchmark: tolerant peer group
To provide a benchmark against which to juxtapose the results on peer pressure equilibria, I
consider a peer group that exerts no pressure at all. To do this, suppose ￿rst that individual
θ is an accepted member of the group in any post-school year t ≥ 1 and assume Nature
has revealed the contribution κt. Before any individual compliance decision for the period is
taken, assume the individual makes a costless (i.e. cheap talk) statement about whether he or
she intends to make the contribution κt as required. Formally, for any type θ and realization
κt,l e tτ(κt,θ) describe the θ￿s statement of intent, where τ(κt,θ)=0[respectively, 1]m e a n s
θ claims he or she does not [respectively, does] intend to contribute κt.I t i s n o t h a r d t o
see that since making the statement involves no costs to the individual irrespective of any
realization (κt,θ), the preceding analysis of peer pressure equilibria is wholly unaﬀected;
given the peer pressure strategy [P1], the possibility of cheap talk adds nothing. However,
in groups devoid of peer pressure, the option to make cheap talk statements has bite.
A tolerant group is a peer group that adopts the following strategy:
[T1] : At t =0 ,c h o o s eα∗
0(s)=1all s ∈ [0,1] and, for all t ≥ 1,c h o o s e
α
∗
t(ht−1)=1⇔ [τ(κt,•)=1and, ∀r =1 ,...,t, h t−r : dt−r = τ(κt−r,•)].
In words, all individuals are accepted during the school years and any individual is accepted
25by the group in any period t ≥ 1 so long as that individual states that he or she intends
to make the period t required contribution and has always honoured previous statements of
intent. An individual is rejected in period t alone if she states an intention not to contribute
and has always done as she claimed she would in the past; and an individual is rejected for
all periods if she has ever claimed an intention to contribute but then reneged on that claim.
Tolerant groups are therefore more like trading partners than peer groups in which the op-
portunities for mutually pro￿table trade arrive stochastically and depend on an individual￿s
type.
Given a tolerant group, de￿ne the (low) type θ
T to be that type who is indiﬀerent
between making every required contribution κt ∈ {0,k} in every period and making only
the contribution κt =0in any period t. It is not hard to see that θ
T is independent of δ.

















Thus any type greater than θ
T only claims an intention to contribute when the required
contribution is negligible; only the low types θ ≤ θ
T oﬀer to make the high contribution.
Given [T1], all claims under [T2] are honoured.
Call any equilibrium in which post-school year behaviour is described by [T1] and [T2],
a tolerant equilibrium.
Proposition 8 There exists a tolerant equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ 1/[1+π]. Moreover, if
there exists a tolerant equilibrium, then there exists a tolerant equilibrium in which all types
separate in the school years.
Tolerant groups can survive in equilibrium only when individuals are suﬃciently patient
relative to the likelihood of having to contribute k>0 to the group. To see why the ￿rst
26condition is required, recall that statements of intent are cheap talk and the payoﬀ under for
an individual who reneges on his stated intent under [T1], is identical to that of an accepted
group member who defects under the peer pressure strategy [P1]. Similarly, the payoﬀ to an
individual from making every contribution to the group is the same irrespective of whether
the group is tolerant or subject to peer pressure. Consequently, a necessary condition for the
existence of a tolerant group is that the value to an individual of always stating his or her
intent honestly and so remaining in the group at least for some periods, is at least as big as
the value of stating an intention to contribute k, reneging on this statement once accepted
by the group for that period, but being rejected thereafter. This condition is that θ
T ≤ ￿ θ(δ)
or, equivalently, that the joint restriction on δ and π holds.
When individuals are relatively impatient, tolerant groups do not exist and some form
of peer pressure is required to support the group. On the other hand, since tolerant groups
have evident prima facie eﬃciency advantages over groups with peer pressure when tolerant
equilibria exist, the obvious question is under what circumstances might peer eﬀects be
observed when the tolerant strategy [T1] is available? Let σ(θ) denote the peer pressure
equilibrium educational strategy. Then we have
Proposition 9 Assume there exists a tolerant equilibrium. Then the group prefers peer






In interpreting this result, it should be emphasized that the assumption of an anthro-
pomorphized group makes the analysis here essentially one of the group￿s decision on the
marginal prospective individual, the individual θ. Consequently, without explicitly allocat-
ing the group￿s costs and bene￿ts among existing members, virtually nothing can be said
about all individuals￿ relative payoﬀs across the equilibria. The exception is that all types
27who separate and are rejected in the school years under peer pressure, are strictly better oﬀ
with a tolerant group than otherwise. On the other hand, the proposition does show that
peer pressure is more likely to be preferred when the bene￿ts of from an individual (i.e. b)
are relatively high or when the distribution of types is distinctly skewed to the right and
there is a high proportion of low types in the population.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The model here formalizes a notion of peer pressure and explores its implications for individ-
uals￿ education decisions during their school years. Together, two of the main results from
the model yield the motivating stylized facts regarding peer pressure and underachievement
documented in the sociology literature: ￿rst, there exist no equilibria in which all types of
individual adopt distinct educational investment levels and, second, when individuals are
not too patient, all equilibria satisfying a standard re￿nement involve a binary partition of
the type space in which all types accepted by the group pool on a common low education
and all types rejected by the group separate at distinctly higher levels of education with
correspondingly higher wages.
A third main result bears on the relative importance of peer pressure incentives. The
formal result is that when individuals are very patient, the re￿ned equilibria do not exist
but a fairly natural (at least in spirit) extension of the re￿nement predicts an increase in
the variation of education levels within the group and an increase in the variance of types
deemed acceptable by the group. Substantively, this translates into stating that the more
those involved discount the future, the more acute peer pressure becomes and the more
homogenous groups become.9 And it is worth remarking that the nondegenerate pooling
9Along these lines, the model also supports the intuitive comparative statics that peer pressure becomes
28property of high accepted types when individuals are more patient, illustrated in Figure 3,
oﬀers some justi￿cation for the Milgrom and Oster (1987) and Lundberg and Startz (1983)
assumption that the ability of minority workers is oftentimes perceived more noisily than
that of similarly quali￿ed majority workers. In their analyses, these authors point to some
empirical observations to support this assumption and exploit it to build theories of statistical
discrimination in the work place. Not surprisingly, since the assumption is theoretically
somewhat ad hoc and a key component of their models, it has been criticized (Altonji and
Blank, 1999). Suppose, however, that minority individuals are subject to a peer pressure at
school from which majority individuals are free. Then, in equilibrium, a minority individual
and a majority individual can both achieve the same intermediate educational level but,
whereas the latter can do so through separation, to avoid peer rejection the former can only
do so through pooling with other minority types. Thus the two signals are indeed distinct
in the way postulated by Milgrom et al.
One further result worth emphasizing is that there always exist some types of individual in
equilibrium who ￿succumb￿ to peer pressure and are accepted by the group in the school years,
but who subsequently defect from the group when expected to make a high contribution.
This last result predicts the existence of individuals who ￿nd themselves eventually rejected
by their peers yet distinctly under-educated relative to what they would have been absent
peer pressure. Consequently, since education is accrued in the model only during the school
years, these individuals realize no change in their economic well-being once out of the group.
Along similar lines, it is not hard to check that if all ￿rms experience a uniform upward
shift in productivity (say, for all strictly positive (s,θ), dy(s,θ) > 0) then (at least in a D1
equilibrium) the wages of those rejected by the group in the school years correspondingly
more acute as the expected contribution level increases, and as the costs to the group of any individual
defecting once admitted increase.
29increase and do so strictly more than any increase in wages of those accepted by the peer
group; in particular, group members experience no economic improvement in a zero education
equilibrium. Against this, the change in wages for rejected group members induces the
marginal group member to break away in the school years and join those rejected by the
group.
The qualitative character of the results is robust to changes in some of the assumptions.
For instance, the assumption that required contributions from an individual to the group
are either low or high is a convenience. Assuming instead that such contributions could
take any one of a continuum of values induces a corresponding continuum of thresholds such
that diﬀerent types defect from the group at diﬀerent cost levels. The main consequence
of the change is that attrition from the group might occur during multiple periods, with
the highest admitted types defecting earliest. All else, including the basic structure of
equilibrium educational investment decisions, remains as described. On the other hand,
the restriction on admissible wage contracts that might be oﬀered by ￿rms is important.
Given the presumed technology, an employee whose type is not known surely at the time of
employment will necessarily reveal his or her type after one day of work since de facto output
and the employee￿s education are observed; there are then incentives for renegotiating the
wage contract for future periods. Furthermore, since the group can observe any member￿s
income, an individual￿s status as a group member or not can be aﬀected. Incorporating
wage renegotiation leads to considerable complications and the equilibrium consequences of
admitting a full slate of contracts is as yet obscure.
306 Appendix
For any r ∈ [0,1] and a ∈ {0,1},d e ￿ne
E(r)v(1 − θ￿ κ|a) ≡ rv(1|a)+( 1− r)v(1 − θk|a).
L e m m a1i d e n t i ￿es a group member￿s best response to the peer pressure strategy [P1] con-
ditional on being accepted by the group in the school years.
Lemma 1 Suppose σ and the peer pressure strategy [P1] are played in an equilibrium and





t[b θ(δ)], is a best response to [P1],w h e r e
(1) θ ≤ b θ(δ) ⇒ ψ
∗
t(κt,θ,h t−1)=1for all κt;
(2) θ > b θ(δ) ⇒ [ψ
∗
t(0,θ,h t−1)=1 , ψ
∗
t(k,θ,h t−1)=0 ] .
Moreover, ψ
∗
t(•) is the unique best response strategy to [P1] for all such t>0,u pt ow h e t h e r
b θ(δ) chooses 1 or 0 at κt = k;a n db θ(δ) is strictly increasing in δ on [0,1) with limδ↓0 ￿ θ(δ)=0 .
Proof. Let θ be accepted by the group for the current period t>0 and assume the group
uses the peer pressure strategy. It is, without loss of generality, convenient for the argument
to follow to relabel time so the current (post-school years) period is indexed at zero. If κ =0
then dt =1and dt =0are observationally identical and there is no decision to be taken. So
assume κ = k and ￿rst note that, since lt(•,θ) ≥ 0 for all θ,c h o o s i n gdt =1is not a feasible
action for any type θ > 1/k,i nw h i c hc a s eψt(k,θ,h t−1)=0i st h eu n i q u eb e s tr e s p o n s e
for such types. So assume θ ≤ 1/k.G i v e n[P1], the expected discounted payoﬀ to θ from
choosing to contribute at every cost κt, dt =1all t,i s :




w + E(π)v(1 − θ￿ κ|1)
⁄
(12)
On the other hand, if κt = k and θ chooses not to contribute k>0 today (t) then, under
the peer pressure strategy, θ receives the defect payoﬀ for one period and is subsequently
31rejected by the group thereafter. So the expected payoﬀ from choosing dt =0when κt = k
is:
U[0;k,θ]=w + v(1|1) +
δ
1 − δ
[w + v(1|0)] (13)
Hence, comparing (12) and (13), θ￿s best response decision depends on the diﬀerence,




E(π)v(1 − θ￿ κ|1) − v(1|0)
⁄
.



















(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0). (14)
Since v(l(•,θ)|a) is strictly increasing in l,
lim
θ→0
E(πδ)v(1 − θ￿ κ|1) = v(1|1).
Therefore, for θ suﬃciently small,
E(πδ)v(1 − θ￿ κ|1) > [(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0)].





E(πδ)v(1 − θ￿ κ|1) = πδv(1|1)
and choosing dt =1is not a feasible action for θ > 1/k. However, by (7) and δ < 1,
πδv(1|1) ≤ δv(1|0) < [(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0)].
Therefore, by monotonicity of U[dt;κ,θ] in θ, there exists a unique type ￿ θ ∈ (0,1/k) such
that U[1;k,￿ θ]=U[0;k,￿ θ]. By monotonicity, b θ(δ)=￿ θ is the required type. That is,
E(πδ)v(1 −b θ(δ)￿ κ|1) − [(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0)] ≡ 0. (15)
32Since b θ(δ) < 1/k,i m p l i c i td i ﬀerentiation through (15) with respect to δ yields ￿ θ(δ) strictly
increasing in δ on (0,1).A n d￿nally, that limδ↓0￿ θ(δ)=0follows directly from taking δ → 0
in (15); and the uniqueness claim is apparent from the existence argument. ⁄
Hereafter, assume (as speci￿ed in statement (1) of Lemma 3) that an individual of type b θ(δ)
always chooses to contribute when indiﬀerent.
Lemma 1 identi￿es an individual θ￿s best response ψ
∗
t, to the peer pressure strategy,
contingent on being an accepted member of the group at the start of any period t ≥ 1.




Lemma 2 Let σ(θ) be an individual θ￿s educational investment decision at t =0 .T h e ni n
any peer pressure equilibrium the group accepts the individual during the school years if
F(￿ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) >
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
and only if this inequality is weak.
Proof. By assumption, rejecting the individual during the school years, a0(σ(θ)) = 0,
implies a zero payoﬀ to the group thereafter. On the other hand, by Lemma 1, accepting
the individual in t =0yields an expected payoﬀ to the group of b>0 in each period if the
individual is type θ ≤ ￿ θ(δ) but not if θ > ￿ θ(δ). Suppose the group accepts θ > ￿ θ(δ).T h e n
with probability 1−π the group receives −Bk < 0 in t =1following which the group rejects
θ and receives zero thereafter, and with probability π the group receives b and θ remains an
accepted group member, in which case the same lottery confronts the group for t =2 ;a n d
so on. Discounting back to t =0 , the expected payoﬀ to the group of accepting individual
θ > ￿ θ(δ) in the school years sums to
[πb − (1 − π)Bk]γ
1 − πγ
.
33Hence, in any peer pressure equilibrium the expected value to the group of accepting an













+[ 1− F(￿ θ(δ)|σ(θ))]
γ[πb − (1 − π)Bk]
1 − πγ
.
Therefore, the group accepts an individual with educational investment σ(θ) in the school















t=1),w] ≥ 0 ⇔
F(￿ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) ≥
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
.
as required for necessity. Furthermore, by (7), the RHS of the inequality lies strictly between
zero and one. That the group accepts surely whenever the preceding inequalities are strict
follows from sequential rationality. ⁄
For future reference, recall
F0 ≡
[(1 − π)Bk− πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
for the minimal belief necessary for the group to accept an individual into the group.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1The proposition follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. ⁄
In o wc o n ￿rm some familiar properties of equilibrium strategies σ.B y( 6 ) ,n o￿rm will
employ an individual without any education. Consequently, an individual θ￿s expected payoﬀ























t(ht−1))] depends on σ(θ) only
insofar as θ￿s eﬀort choice in￿uences whether θ is accepted by the group in the school years.
In particular, if α∗
0(σ(θ)) = 0 then V (0;θ,δ)=δv(1|0)/(1 − δ).
Lemma 3 Consider any pair of types θ
0, θ
00 and let σ be any equilibrium educational invest-
ment strategy. Suppose α0(σ(θ
0)) = α0(σ(θ





Proof. Write s0 ≡ σ(θ
0), w0 ≡ w(σ(θ
0),F|σ(θ0)), and so forth. Then for the pair of types θ
0,
θ













































And since csθ(s,θ) < 0 by (1), θ
0 < θ
00 and the inequality jointly imply s0 ≤ s00, as claimed.
⁄
Thus educational choice is monotonic in type, both among group members and among
those rejected by the group. The next result con￿rms the ineﬃciency inherent in separating
equilibria, should they exist. For any type θ,l e tσc
a0(θ) denote the individual￿s utility maxi-
mizing choice of educational eﬀort assuming θ is common knowledge and group membership
is ￿xed at a0 ∈ {0,1}.
35Lemma 4 Let I ⊆ [0,θ) be any open interval, and assume σ is a separating equilibrium
strategy on I.S u p p o s e α0(σ(θ)) = a0 ∈ {0,1} is constant on I. Then for all θ ∈ I,
σ(θ) > σc
a0(θ).
Proof. By Lemma 3 and (e.g.) Royden (1968), since α0 ∈ {0,1} is constant in σ(θ)
on I, σ(•) is diﬀerentiable in θ almost everywhere on this interval. And α0 invariant also
gives V (α0(σ(θ));θ,δ)=V (α0;θ,δ) all θ ∈ I.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e σ(θ) is separating and so
(by de￿nition) fully reveals θ,( 8 )i m p l i e sw(σ(θ),F|σ(θ))=y(σ(θ),θ). Consequently, local


























[(1 − δ)(v0(•|a0)+cs) − δys]
, (17)
where the arguments of the functions are suppressed. By assumption, σ is a separating
equilibrium strategy on I a n ds oL e m m a3r e q u i r e sdσ(θ)/dθ > 0 almost everywhere on the
interval. Hence, (17) implies
[(1 − δ)(v
0(•|a0)+cs) − δys]|s=σ(θ) > 0. (18)
Now by de￿nition, σc
a0(θ) is a solution to the ￿rst order condition
d
ds




So, because the second order condition holds under the maintained assumptions, σc
a0(θ)
uniquely solves
[δys − (1 − δ)(v
0(•|a0)+cs)]|s=σc
a0(θ) =0 . (19)
The Lemma now follows by comparing (18) with (19). ⁄
36Remark 1 Given (3), inspection of (17) and (19) yields that under complete information -
either through use of a separating strategy or because types are common knowledge ex ante
-a l lθ > 0 individuals invest strictly more eﬀort in education if they are rejected by the
group than if they are accepted.
To save on notation, for any education strategy σ, group action a0,a n dt y p eθ let




Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose the contrary and let σ be an equilibrium separating
strategy, so w(σ(θ),F|σ(θ))=y(σ(θ),θ) for all θ. By Lemma 2, there exists (in equilibrium)
some type θ
◦ ≤ ￿ θ(δ) such that α0(σ(θ)) = 1 if and only if θ ≤ θ
◦;w r i t eσ(θ)=σ0(θ) if θ > θ
◦,
and write σ(θ)=σ1(θ) if θ ≤ θ
◦. By continuity of individual utility, θ
◦ must be indiﬀerent
between being accepted and being rejected by the group in the school years. Using (16) and
σ separating, θ








Because all θ > 0 are employed in a separating equilibrium, de￿nition of ￿ θ(δ) in the proof to
Lemma 1 [see (14) and (15)] implies
V (1;θ,δ) − V (0;θ,δ) ≥ v(1|1) − v(1 − θk|1) > 0





◦,δ) > 0. (21)
And under the maintained assumptions, (21) in turn requires σ0(θ
◦) > σ1(θ









◦) ≥ 0. (22)
37But since U(s,a0;θ
◦,δ) is strictly concave in s for each a0 and v(l|0) <v (l|1) all l>0,( 2 1 )
and (22) imply σc
1(θ
◦) ≥ σ1(θ
◦) which contradicts Lemma 4. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3Since the prior cdf F is smooth with support [0,θ), claim (1) follows
directly from Lemmas 2 and 3. To establish the second claim, assume R(σ∗,α∗
0) 6=[ 0 ,θ) and
let θ
m ≡ inf R(σ∗,α∗





m+†),t h e nL e m m a3i m p l i e sσ∗(θ) must be separating on (θ
m−†0,θ
m+†0)
for some †0 > 0.B yd e ￿nition of θ
m, limη↓0 α∗
0(σ∗(θ




m must be indiﬀerent between being accepted and being rejected by the group,
the argument for Proposition 2 implies that either inf R(σ∗,α∗
0) < θ
m −†0 or inf R(σ∗,α∗
0) >
θ
m + †0, a contradiction in both cases. Finally, suppose σ∗ is separating on the interval
(θ
m,θ
m + †) with †>0 and θ
m ≡ inf R(σ∗,α∗
0) < ￿ θ(δ).T h e n t h e r e e x i s t η > 0 such that
θ
m +η < ￿ θ(δ); by Lemma 2, therefore, α∗
0(σ∗(θ
m +η)) = 1, contradicting θ
m +η ∈ R(σ∗,α∗
0)
and proving (3). ⁄
Proof of Proposition 4 By Proposition 2, σ∗ cannot be separating on [0,θ) and, by (1),
σ∗(θ) < 1 for all θ ∈ [0,θ) in any equilibrium. By Proposition 3, R(σ∗,α∗
0) is an interval
(θ
∗,θ);l e tlimη↓0 σ∗(θ
∗+η)=s∗. By Cho & Sobel (1990, Lemma 4.1(d)), if the equilibrium is
D1 then it is supported by beliefs under which, for any out-of-equilibrium signal s0 >s ∗,t h e
group￿s best response is likewise α0(s0)=0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,s i n c es∗ < 1, we can apply Cho &
Sobel (1990, Proposition 4.1) to yield pooling on R(σ∗,α∗
0) inconsistent with D1. Therefore,
if σ∗ is part of a D1 peer pressure equilibrium, σ∗ must be separating on R(σ∗,α∗
0), proving
the ￿r s tp a r to f(2). Proposition 3 now implies there exists some θ
0 < θ
∗ such that σ∗(θ)=ﬂ s




∗ ≥ ￿ θ(δ). To complete the argument for (1),w eh a v et o
show θ
0 =0 .
38Suppose σ∗(θ) is not constant in θ on A(σ∗,α∗
0)=[ 0 ,θ
∗]. Then by Lemma 3 there exists
an equilibrium educational investment level s<ﬂ s such that σ∗(θ)=s for some θ ∈ A(σ∗,α∗
0)
and σ∗(θ) ∈ (s,ﬂ s) for no θ ∈ [0,θ). Furthermore, Lemma 3 and (equilibrium) U continuous





◦,δ). But then the argument for Cho & Sobel (1990, Proposition
4.1) can again be applied, mutatis mutandis, to derive a contradiction with D1. Hence, if σ∗
is part of a D1 peer pressure equilibrium, θ
0 =0and σ∗ must be pooling on A(σ∗,α∗
0) with
σ∗(θ)=ﬂ s for all θ ∈ A(σ∗,α∗
0).
Let σ∗(θ)=ﬂ s for all θ ∈ A(σ∗,α∗
0)=[ 0 ,θ
∗],a n dl e tlimη↓0 σ∗(θ
∗ + η)=s∗.I tr e m a i n st o
check s∗ = σc
0(θ







By Lemma 4 and concave preferences in s, s∗ ≥ σc
0(θ
∗) > s. Suppose s∗ > σc
0(θ
∗) and consider
the out-of-equilibrium deviation, σ(θ
∗)=σc
0(θ
∗).S i n c eα∗
0(σ∗(θ)) = 0 for all θ > θ
∗ and θ
∗ ≥
￿ θ(δ), Lemma 2 implies (generically) the group would reject θ
∗ conditional on identifying θ
∗
and σ(θ
∗) ≥ s. Thus, Cho & Sobel (1990, Lemma 4.1(d)) yields that both ￿rms and the group
put probability zero on the deviation being sent by any type θ < θ
∗; and de￿nition of σc
0(θ
∗)
implies all probability weight is placed on θ





continuity implies, limη↓0 U(σ∗(θ
∗ +η),0;θ
∗+η,δ) < limη↓0 U(σc
0(θ
∗),0;θ
∗+η,δ).H e n c e ,f o r
suﬃciently small η > 0, θ
∗+η strictly prefers to deviate to σc
0(θ
∗), contradicting s∗ > σc
0(θ
∗)
in a D1 equilibrium. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5Fix δ ∈ (0,1) arbitrarily and write ￿ θ(δ) ≡ ￿ θ.B y P r o p o s i t i o n
4, it suﬃces to consider educational investment strategies of the following form: for any
θ
0 ∈ [￿ θ,ﬂ θ),d e ￿ne the strategy σ(•|θ
0) such that, for all θ ≤ θ
0, σ(θ|θ




0) is the separating strategy de￿ned by the unique solution to (17)













and note that, for any θ > θ
0, w(σa(θ|θ
0),F|σa(•))=y(σa(θ|θ
0),θ) > 0;w r i t ewsep(θ;θ
0) ≡
y(σa(θ|θ
0),θ). With these preliminaries, consider the suﬃciency argument.
(Suﬃciency) The proof is by construction: I ￿rst show there exists a D1 equilibrium at
δ in which all accepted types pool on s =0if, and only if, ￿ θ weakly prefers adopting the
pooling strategy σ(θ|￿ θ)=0to the separating strategy σ0(θ|￿ θ)=σc
0(￿ θ);It h e na r g u et h a t
￿ θ(δ) weakly prefers this pooling strategy if and only if δ ≤ δ1.S o s e t θ
0 = ￿ θ(δ) ≡ ￿ θ and
choose s =0 ; then by (6) and (8), ω(s;￿ θ) ≡ w(0,•)=0 .B y L e m m a 2 , α0(0) = 1 and,
by Lemma 2 and σa(•|￿ θ) continuous on (￿ θ,ﬂ θ), α0(σc
a(￿ θ)) = a =0 .W r i t i n g σc
0(￿ θ)=￿ s and
suppressing the arguments identifying post-school year strategies, the payoﬀst o￿ θ for using




E(π)v(1 − ￿ θ￿ κ|1) (23)
and
u[￿ s,0,w




sep(￿ θ;￿ θ)+v(1|0)]. (24)
If u[0,1,0;￿ θ] <u [￿ s,0,w sep(￿ θ;￿ θ);￿ θ] then ￿ θ strictly prefers to separate and, by Lemma 3 and
monotonicity of payoﬀsi nt y p e ,u[0,1,0;θ] <u [σc
0(θ),0,wsep(θ;θ);θ] for all θ > ￿ θ.B y
Proposition 3, therefore, no D1 equilibrium with accepted types pooling on s =0exists in
this case. Suppose u[0,1,0;￿ θ] ≥ u[￿ s,0,w sep(￿ θ;￿ θ);￿ θ]. If the weak inequality in fact holds with
equality then, by monotonicity of payoﬀs in type, Propositions 1 and 4 imply (σ(•|￿ θ),α0)
supports a D1 peer pressure equilibrium. Suppose the inequality holds strictly so, conditional
on other agents￿ strategies, ￿ θ strictly prefers pooling on s =0and being accepted by the
group to separating on ￿ s and being rejected by the group.
40By Lemma 1(2), for any θ
0 > ￿ θ, the expected discounted payoﬀ at t =0from pooling on














with the inequality following from the de￿nition of ￿ θ. Therefore, by continuity of E(π)v(1 −
θ￿ κ|1) and wsep(θ;￿ θ) in θ,i fu[0,1,0;￿ θ] >u [￿ s,0,w sep(￿ θ;￿ θ);￿ θ] then there exists an open
interval of types I =( ￿ θ,￿ θ + †) ⊆ R(σ(•|￿ θ),α0) such that, for all θ ∈ I, u[0,1,0;θ] >
u[σ0(θ|￿ θ),0,w sep(θ;￿ θ);θ]. Holding s =0￿xed for the pooling set of types, consider an edu-
cational investment strategy, σ(•|θ
0) where ￿ θ < θ
0 < ￿ θ + †. Since investing in no education
implies a zero wage, conditional on α0(0) = 1 all types θ ∈ [0,￿ θ] are indiﬀerent between play-
ing σ(θ|θ
0) or σ(θ|￿ θ).A n d b y d e ￿nition of σ(•|θ
0) and θ





therefore, by Lemma 4, θ





0|￿ θ).B yd e ￿nition
of ￿ θ, F(￿ θ|σ(θ|￿ θ)=0 )=1 ;s ob yF smooth and Lemma 2, for θ
0 = ￿ θ + η with η > 0 suﬃ-
ciently small, σ(θ|θ
0)=0implies α0(0) = 1. Consider an increasing sequence of educational
investment strategies {σ(•|θn)}
θ∞=ﬂ θ
θ0=￿ θ . By the preceding remarks, wages are constant at zero
on the pooling segment and wsep(θn;θn) is strictly increasing in θn along the sequence and,
for all n, α0(σ(θ|θn)) = 1 only if σ(θ|θn)=0 .D e ￿ne the diﬀerence




Doing the calculus and taking account of the de￿nition of σc
0(θn) as the complete information
optimal decision for θn conditional on being excluded from the group, it is straightforward to
con￿rm that ∆(θn) is strictly decreasing in θn. There are two possibilities: either ∆(θn)=0
for some θn ∈ (￿ θ,θ
#],w h e r eθ
# is de￿ned by F(￿ θ|σ(θ|θ
#)=0 )=F0 < 1;o r∆(θn) > 0
at θn = θ
#.I nt h e￿rst case Proposition 4 implies the strategies (σ(•|θn),α0) support a D1
41peer pressure equilibrium. Consider the second case. By Lemma 2 and de￿nition of θ
#,t h e
group is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting any individual choosing σ(θ|θ
#)=0 ;



























By payoﬀ monotonicity, given the mixed response to s =0all types θ > θ





#) than to pool on s =0 . And since educational investment
cannot be negative, no type θ < θ
# can deviate to a lower investment. By D1, any deviation
to some out-of-equilibrium level s0 ∈ (0,σc
0(θ
#|θ
#)) is believed by the group to be sent by
θ
# > ￿ θ and so induces sure rejection by the group. Therefore no type can make a pro￿table
deviation and the strategies again support a D1 equilibrium. This completes the ￿rst step of
the argument; it remains to show there exists some δ1 ∈ (0,1) such that ￿ θ(δ) weakly prefers
pooling on s =0to separating with σc
0(￿ θ(δ)|￿ θ(δ)) if and only if δ ≤ δ1.
Assume the strategy σ(•|￿ θ(δ)) is to be played with pooling on s =0 .T h e n
u[0,1,0;￿ θ(δ)] = v(1|1) +
δ
1 − δ





E(π)v(1 − ￿ θ(δ)￿ κ|1)
[1 − δ]2 −
δ
1 − δ
∂v(1 − ￿ θ(δ)k|1)
∂l
(1 − π)k￿ θ
0
(δ). (25)
Similarly let s(￿ θ(δ),δ) ≡ σc
0(￿ θ(δ)) and [￿ v−￿ c](δ) ≡ [v(1−s(￿ θ(δ),δ)|0)−c(s(￿ θ(δ),δ),￿ θ(δ))],s o
u[σc
0(￿ θ(δ)),0,w sep(￿ θ(δ);￿ θ(δ));￿ θ(δ)] =
[￿ v − ￿ c](δ)+
δ
1 − δ
[y(s(￿ θ(δ),δ),￿ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)]
42and, by the Envelope Theorem,
du[σc















y(•,￿ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)
[1 − δ]2 . (26)
By (15), limδ↓0￿ θ(δ)=0 . Hence
lim
δ↓0




= v(1|1) − v(1|0) > 0. (27)






















(1 − δ)[￿ v − ￿ c]+δ[y(s(￿ θ(δ),δ),￿ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)]
i
,
(15) and ￿ θ(δ) < 1/k imply limδ↑1 ∆(￿ θ(δ)) < 0.T h e r e f o r e ,b yc o n t i n u i t yt h e r ee x i s t sa tl e a s t

































E(π)v(1 − ￿ θ(δ1)￿ κ|1) − (y(•,￿ θ(δ1)) + v(1|0))
i
.
By de￿nition, ∆(￿ θ(δ1)) = 0 so the RHS of the preceding inequality is strictly negative, and
the maintained assumptions imply the LHS of the inequality is strictly positive. Therefore,
43(27) and continuity imply there can exist at most one value of δ ∈ (0,1) at which ∆(￿ θ(δ)) = 0.
Setting this value equal to δ1 then proves the suﬃciency part of the Proposition.
(Necessity) To establish the necessity claim, assume δ > δ1. By the argument for Suﬃ-
ciency, there is no D1 equilibrium in which σ(θ|θ
0)=0for all θ ≤ θ
0 ∈ [￿ θ(δ),ﬂ θ). Therefore, if
there is a D1 peer pressure equilibrium at δ, there must exist some educational investment
eﬀort s0 such that: (i) for all θ ≤ ￿ θ(δ), σ(θ|￿ θ(δ)) = s0 > 0; (ii) ￿ θ(δ) weakly prefers choosing
s0 to the separating investment level σc
0(￿ θ(δ));a n d(iii) the lowest type, θ =0 , weakly prefers
choosing s0 to choosing any smaller educational eﬀort. Noting that assumptions on F insure
ω(s0;θ
0) is increasing in θ
0, Properties (i) and (ii) follow from the same reasoning as for the
￿r s tp a r to ft h eS u ﬃciency argument, with pooling on s0 rather than on zero; to see why
(iii) must hold, suppose all types θ ∈ (0,￿ θ(δ)] pool on σ(θ|￿ θ(δ)) = s0 and θ =0deviates to
any educational investment level s<s 0. Such a deviation constitutes an out-of-equilibrium
message and, by monotonicity, D1 requires the ￿rms￿ and the group￿s beliefs about the type
sending the message to be concentrated on the lowest type. Hence, (6) and (8) imply the
wage induced by such a deviation is y(s,0) < ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)), and Lemma 2 implies the group
surely accepts θ =0consequent on observing the deviation. So if θ =0strictly prefers to
separate at some s<s 0, then pooling on s0 for the accepted set of types is untenable in
any D1 peer pressure equilibrium. Therefore, D1 equilibria exist at δ only if there is some
s0 such that (i) holds and, for all s ∈ [0,s 0),
v(1 − s0|1) − c(s0,0) +
δ
1 − δ
[ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)) + v(1|1)]





v(1 − s0|1) − c(s0,￿ θ(δ)) +
δ
1 − δ
[ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)) + E(π)v(1 − ￿ θ(δ)￿ κ|1)]
44≥ v(1 − σ
c
0(￿ θ(δ))|0) − c(σ
c




sep(￿ θ(δ);￿ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)].




[v(1 − s|1) − c(s,0) − v(1 − s0|1) + c(s0,0)] + y(s;0); (28)
and





0(￿ θ(δ))|0) − c(σ
c
0(￿ θ(δ)),￿ θ(δ)) − v(1 − s0|1) + c(s0,￿ θ(δ))]. (29)
Suppose there exists an investment level s0 > 0 at δ = δ1 such that both (28) and (29) obtain,
and let δ → 1 holding s0 ￿xed. From Lemma 1, ￿ θ(δ) is strictly increasing in δ on (0,1) with
limδ↑1 ￿ θ(δ) < ∞. Hence, ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)) is nondecreasing in δ, limδ↑1 ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)) ≥ ω(s0;￿ θ(δ1)),
and (28) continues to hold as we proceed to the limit. Consider (29). By Lemma 1, ￿ θ(δ) < 1/k
for all δ < 1. Therefore, since every term in the square brackets on RHS(29) is ￿nite under
the maintained assumptions, limδ↑1 RHS(29) ≥ 0.B u t σc
0(￿ θ(δ)) >s 0 for all δ ∈ [δ1,1),s o
ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)) <w sep(￿ θ(δ);￿ θ(δ)) all δ ∈ [δ1,1) which implies
lim
δ→1
[ω(s0;￿ θ(δ)) − w
sep(￿ θ(δ);￿ θ(δ))] < 0.
Hence, (29) cannot hold for δ suﬃciently high. Therefore, if both (28) and (29) hold at
δ = δ1 for s0 > 0,t h e r em u s te x i s ts o m eδ2 ∈ (δ1,1) such that (29) fails at every δ > δ2.
This completes the proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6This proposition is proved by the argument for the Suﬃciency
claim of Proposition 5. ⁄
Proof of Proposition 7 Given the separating assumption on the restriction of σ∗ to
R(σ∗,α∗
0), Proposition 3(3) says inf R(σ∗,α∗
0) ≡ θ
∗ ≥ ￿ θ(δ) and Proposition 3(2) implies there
45m u s tb eap o o l i n gs e g m e n t(θ1,θ
∗) on which σ∗ is constant. If θ1 ≥ ￿ θ(δ) then Lemma 2 and
sequential rationality imply α∗
0(σ∗(θ)) = 0, contradicting θ
∗ =i n fR(σ∗,α∗
0);s oθ1 < ￿ θ(δ;10).
And if θ1 =0then the equilibrium would satisfy the D1 re￿nement, contradicting δ > δ1
by Proposition 4. Because Lemma 3 and θ1 > 0 give σ∗(θ) ∈ (0,σc
0(θ
∗)) for all θ ∈ (θ1,θ
∗),
these facts establish claim (1). Claim (2) simply exhausts the possibilities for any equilibrium
behaviours on the segment [0,θ1). ⁄
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1The claim follows directly from Proposition 3(2), Proposition 3(3)
and the de￿nition of ￿ θ(δ) as the type just indiﬀerent between remaining in the group and
contributing for all κt, and contributing to the group only if κt =0 . ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8The strategy [T1] is easily seen to be a best response to [T2]
for the post-school years. So ￿x [T1] and consider an individual group member θ asked to
contribute k>0 in period t ≥ 1 (trivially, if κt =0 , θ￿s best response is τ(0,θ)=dt =1 ). The
discounted expected values to θ from contributing k and from stating she will contribute,
being accepted, and reneging on her statement, are given by expressions (12) and (13),
respectively, above. That is, θ is indiﬀerent between always contributing k, and only claiming
an intention to contribute, but in fact reneging on her claim once accepted by the group in
the period, iﬀ θ = ￿ θ(δ) as de￿ned earlier. On the other hand, θ￿s expected discounted payoﬀ
under [T1] from stating she will not contribute k in period t (but only contribute when
κt =0 ), is
w + v(j|0) +
δ
1 − δ
[w + πv(j|1) + (1 − π)v(j|0)].
Hence, under [T1], the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ from stating an intention to contribute













[πv(j|1) + (1 − π)v(j|0)]
‚
.
46Collecting terms this diﬀerence is nonpositive if and only if δ ≥ 1/[1 + π]. Therefore, given
this inequality, all types prefer to be honest about their intentions to contribute and so
be accepted by the group whenever they propose to contribute, to dissembling when the
required contribution is high and reaping the one period gain from the deception. Now by
de￿nition, θ
T is the type indiﬀerent between always contributing and only contributing at
low cost, κt =0 . From (12), at any wage the expected payoﬀ from always contributing is
strictly decreasing in θ. It follows that δ ≥ 1/[1 + π] implies θ
T ≤ ￿ θ(δ) and [T2] describes
the best response to [T1].
If δ < 1/[1 + π] then θ
T > ￿ θ(δ) and all types θ > ￿ θ(δ) strictly prefer to lie about
their intent to contribute k in any period, in which case [T1] and [T2] cannot constitute
equilibrium strategies.
Since only types θ ≤ θ
T always contribute under [T1] and [T2], the tolerant group￿s










Thus accepting all individuals is rational if and only F(θ
T|σ(θ)) ≥ 0, which is trivially the
case.
Assume there exists a tolerant equilibrium. Then because all types are accepted by
the group in the school years irrespective of their educational investment, and all types
strictly prefer to be honest regarding group contributions in the post-school years, there is
no incentive induced by [T1] for an individual to conceal his or her true type from the group.
Consequently, given all types are accepted, the separating result follows from the standard
existence argument for the Spence job-market signaling game. And since the tolerant group￿s
expected payoﬀ conditional on accepting θ is no smaller than πb/(1−πγ), accepting all types
in the school years is a best response here. ⁄
47Proof of Proposition 9 From the argument for Lemma 2, above, conditional on accepting




+[ 1− F(￿ θ(δ)|σ(θ))]
[πb − (1 − π)Bk]
1 − πγ
.
And since only types θ ≤ θ
T always contribute under [T1] and [T2], the tolerant group￿s










Taking the diﬀerence between these two values gives the result. ⁄
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Figure 1: Payoﬀs for marginal type under complete information
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Figure 2: Typical D1 peer pressure equilibrium strategies, (σ∗,α∗
0)
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Figure 3: Existence of D1 peer pressure equilibria
53θ
σ *
θ * θ^() δ θ 1
Accepted types ] [
θ
σ *
θ * θ^() δ θ 1
Accepted types ] [
Figure 4: Peer pressure equilibria at a high discount factor
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